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Abstract 
The Millennium Development Goals have become the frame of reference for most of 
the development community: the standard by which performance will ultimately be 
judged. Given their importance, considerable attention has been paid as to whether these 
goals will be met or not. The overwhelming conclusions from such analyses are not 
positive. The goals will not be met. There are exceptions—education has expanded 
rapidly, although questions are raised about quality, and some countries, notably in 
South East Asia, but also South Asia to a lesser extent, have done well across the board 
and will meet several of the goals. But many countries, most especially in Africa, will 
not. The projections show that poverty will become more heavily concentrated in Africa 
in both relative and absolute terms. In addition, whilst urban poverty will increase, in 
2015 poverty will remain a predominately rural phenomenon, with 60-70 per cent of the 
poor (depending on the measure) living in rural areas. But these projections are based 
on assumptions, including the assumption of business as usual. Various adverse shocks 
may result in far worse scenarios. On the other hand, more intensive promotion of pro-
poor policies can mean that the goals might yet be realized. 
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 1 
1 Introduction 
Since the adoption of the International Development Targets, and their successor 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a growing number of publications have 
presented estimates of development outcomes in 2015, the target year for most of the 
goals. What most these projections show is that the developing world as a whole is ‘off 
track’ with respect to most targets. They will not, in aggregate, be met and many 
countries will fall far short. The MDGs seem set to pass into history as another set of 
missed development targets.  
 
This paper looks at the soundness of these dire projections. Section 2 briefly discusses 
the basis for making such projections and then findings for major MDG targets (income 
poverty, mortality, education, nutrition and HIV/AIDS in Sections 3-7). Section 8 
concludes. 
2  Approaches to making projections1 
Projections may vary because of differences in assumptions regarding (1) determinants 
of the outcome of interest, (2) model parameters, or (3) future values of the 
determinants. The simplest models, and by far the most common approach, take time as 
the only determinant, i.e., the future is forecast-based on historical trends, an approach 
called here naïve projections. Naïve projections tell us if a country is on track or not to 
meet the relevant goal, which is certainly of policy interest, but are of less use in 
predicting actual expected values at some point in the future unless its determinants 
really are uncertain or unforecastable. 
 
The next most common approach is to use an outcome-income elasticity to base the 
forecast on projections of economic growth, the latter usually being taken from some 
other source, such as the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects (GEP). Since 
income is highly correlated with most of the outcomes of interest, this approach can be 
expected to give a reasonable first approximation. However the correlation with income 
is imperfect, so adding more variables to the right-hand side of the determinants-
equation will help, at least if the future values of these determinants can be predicted 
with any degree of confidence. More sophisticated versions utilize multi-equation 
models. There are undoubted advantages to such models, which allow a wider range of 
policy simulations, but they are quite resource intensive and assumption dependent. 
Results from the most recent multi-equation model, the World Bank Maquette for MDG 
Simulations (MAMS), are thus far only available for one country (Ethiopia), and such 
approaches are not the basis of the projections presented here. 
 
Some indicators have risen in recent years at a far greater rate than their historical 
precedent—primary enrolment being the most obvious case. In these cases, if naïve 
projections are based on very recent trends then such forecasts may be superior to those 
which are model-based. But naïve projections will under-estimate future growth if the 
period used to calculate expected growth includes many years prior to any recent 
expansion. The main point is that policy can make a difference to the achievement of 
                                                 
1   The Annex presents a fuller discussion of the different approaches.  2 
goals—as shown by the experience of countries which do not follow the expected 
outcome-income trajectory (see World Bank 2005, for a discussion of Bangladesh 
which has been remarkably successful in reducing fertility and mortality faster than 
growth would suggest). If the right policies were to be implemented, then all future 
outcomes would be better than suggested here, though this of course begs the question 
as to what the ‘right policies’ are. 
 
A further source in variation of projections is the level of disaggregation at which they 
are made. Although most sources report results at the regional level, it is preferable that 
these regional aggregates be based on country-level projections using country-specific 
data and parameters. This is not always the case. All methods are of course dependent 
on the quality of data used. Data availability has improved greatly in the last two 
decades, though most outcomes are not available on an annual basis.2 There are also 
exceptions to the general increase in data availability, such as maternal mortality and 
literacy, for which data are less reliable. Moreover, even where data are good there are 
frequently groups missed from the data, notably those not in fixed households (nomads, 
street children, those in institutions, etc.). 
Basis of own projections 
Our own projections are made at the country level and are reported using either the UN 
or World Bank regional classifications. The baseline data (i.e. pre-projection) are from 
the UN Millennium Indicators Database, supplemented by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data as necessary. 
Population data are from the UN Population Database 2004 Revision. Projections are 
made using one of three methods: (1) naïve projections, (2) growth-based estimates, and 
(3) model-based estimates (i.e. growth plus other factors). The latter two approaches use 
differential elasticities to capture the greater poverty-reducing effect of growth in low 
inequality settings. Rural-urban rates are based on country-specific estimates of the 
rural-urban differential. Specific details of the projections are as follows: 
 
•  Income poverty is modelled as a function of income growth alone with the 
elasticity varying according the level of initial inequality. 
•  Under-five mortality is modelled as a function of income poverty (elasticity = 
0.4) and female enrolments (elasticity = -1.3) and an autonomous decline of 1.5 
per cent per annum. 
•  Under-nutrition is modelled as a function of income alone, with the elasticity 
again varying by the level of inequality. 
•  Net enrolments are based on naïve projections, made separately for male and 
female, capped at 98 and the female rate capped at the male rate. 
•  Literacy is calculated in two ways: (1) naïve projections, done separately for 
male and female, and capped at 99.5, and (2) an accounting approach based on 
age structure and net enrolments, removing older, less literate, people from the 
population and adding those graduating from school who are assumed to be 
literate. Again the data are capped at 99.5. 
                                                 
2   They may be reported on an annual basis in sources such as UNDP’s Human Development Report, but 
this is not the same thing. These figures are based on interpolation between available data points. 3 
•  Separate rural and urban estimates are made by using the ratio of rural to urban 
incidence, based on observed values where available and modelled (as a function 
of poverty, urbanization, education and regional dummies) when not available. 
3 Income  poverty 
Early estimates of progress toward reducing income poverty come from studies 
conducted by the Institute of Social Studies for the Sida 2015 project (hereinafter the 
ISS study, Hanmer et al. 1997a, 1997b), and work undertaken by the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI).3 These two studies made forecasts based on estimates of 
the elasticity of poverty with respect to income, allowing the elasticity to vary according 
to the degree of inequality.4 The World Bank has since begun publishing annual 
estimates of income poverty in 2015 in Global Economic Prospects (GEP). These 
estimates are the same as those to be found in the Bank’s MDG Global Monitoring 
Report. The methodology used in these studies is not public, but appears to be based on 
household data rather than cross-country elasticities. Elasticities based on household 
data are generally higher than those from cross-country regressions, so the estimates of 
future numbers of poor will be less than if elasticities estimated using cross-country data 
are used.  
 
Our own estimates follow the ODI-Sida approach applied on a country-by-country 
basis. Projected growth rates are based on regional averages from GEP, with a few 
exceptions. The poverty elasticity is assumed to vary according to initial inequality.5 To 
calculate regional figures of absolute numbers of poor, the total for the region is scaled-
up to capture the population not covered by the data. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the various results. The most recent World Bank estimates present 
a more positive picture than do the earlier studies, except with respect to sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). Our own estimates give figures more similar to those of the earlier 
studies. In general this will be because we assume lower elasticities than those used by 
the World Bank, especially for high inequality countries, so the rate of poverty 
reduction as a consequence of growth is less. However, in the case of Africa, our 
estimates are more positive. This discrepancy is most likely as the World Bank is using 
recent country-specific poverty estimates not available to us. Discrepancies also arise 
from both differing assumed growth rates and data revisions to poverty estimates in the 
base year (1990). More recent growth forecasts are generally more positive than the 
older ones6 and estimates of poverty in 1990 have been revised downward, especially 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). 
                                                 
3   The same person, Lucia Hanmer, was responsible for the design of the quantitative aspects of both 
these studies. 
4    Forecasting was also carried out by Demery and Walton (1998) from the World Bank using an 
approach similar to that used in the ISS and ODI studies, though the results were not presented in a 
way allowing regional tabulations. 
5   The elasticity is taken as -0.5, -0.8 and -1.2 for high, middle and low inequality countries respectively, 
where the former has a Gini coefficient of ≥ 0.54 and the latter ≤ 0.40. 
6   These more positive estimates reflect the relative strength of recent growth performance. Making 
estimates in this way ignores the cyclical nature of growth and possible threats to growth in some 
regions, such as the growing dominance of Asian economies. 4 
Table 1: Income poverty forecasts (% living below $1 a day) for 2015 from three 
studies  
 Sida 
2015 
Hanmer and 
Naschold 
World Bank 
(2005) 
Own 
estimates 
Sub-Saharan Africa  32.4  33.2  38.4  30.0 
Middle East and North Africa  3.4  1.9  0.9  4.2 
East Asia and Pacific  7.2  10.1  0.9  8.4 
South Asia  18.6  23.3  12.8  16.8 
Latin America and Caribbean  14.3  15.7  6.9  16.1 
Eastern Europe and CIS  2.7  3.9  0.4  4.3 
Source: See text. 
 
Income poverty will be increasingly concentrated in Africa (Figure 1), with absolute 
numbers of poor under the $1 a day standard in Africa overtaking South Asia at around 
the current time. If a $2 a day poverty line is used then South Asia will continue to have 
the bulk of the world’s income poor in 2015 (46 per cent), followed by SSA (31 per 
cent). 
Figure 1: Share of global poverty (proportion of poor in each region using $1 a day 
poverty line) 
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Source: Calculated from World Bank GEP data. 
 
Sub-regional estimates 
Sub-regional figures (Table 2) are based on our own income poverty estimates. The 
total number of poor in 2015 (736 million) sits well within the range of earlier World 
Bank estimates, though it is higher than their current projection. The headcount ratio is 
highest in West and East Africa. Central Africa appears better off than Central and 
South America but it should be recalled that most of the African countries do not have 
data, especially those affected by conflict where poverty will be high. These patterns are 
also evident in the map, although the data limitations also show up there (Figure 2). 5 
 
Table 2: Sub-regional income poverty estimates 2015 ($1 a day) 
 
Income poverty in 2015  Progress in halving income 
poverty 
 
 
Headcount 
ratio 
 (% poor) 
 
Number 
(millions) 
 
Population 
share 
(%) 
 
Contribution 
to poverty 
(%) 
 
2015 
headcount as 
% 1990
1 
Number of 
countries 
expected to 
meet goal
2 
East Africa  33.8  122 5.0 16.6  84  0/7 
Central Africa  7.5  11  2.0  1.5  ..  0/0 
North Africa  1.4  3 3.1 0.4  64  0/3 
Southern Africa  11.3 6 0.8  0.8  89  1/5 
West Africa  37.5  124 4.6 16.8  78  1/9 
Eastern Asia  6.1  98 22.2  13.3  21  1/1 
South-central Asia  14.5 271  25.8  36.8  37  6/9 
South-east Asia   4.6 29  8.6  3.9  29  4/6 
Western Asia  3.3  9 3.6 1.2 141  0/2 
Eastern Europe  3.0 9  3.9  1.2 74  2/9 
Northern Europe  1.0  1 1.4 0.1  25  1/2 
Southern Europe  1.0  2  2.1  0.2  52  .. 
Caribbean 1.7  1  0.6  0.1  55  1/3 
Central America   9.7 16  2.3  2.2  51  2/5 
South America  8.5  36 5.9 4.9  97  2/10 
            
Total 10.2  736.3  100.0  100.0  ..  21/71 
Notes: (1) calculated using only countries for which estimates available for both 1990 and 2015. (2) second 
figure is the number of countries for which early 1990s income poverty data were available. (Data 
availability for this column is less than that used for poverty projections, as more recent poverty data were 
usually used for the projections.)  
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
As shown in Table 2, the reasonable progress in reducing income poverty is not usually 
sufficient to meet the MDG of halving poverty by 2015. Of the 71 countries for which 
there are data, less than one-third (21) are expected to achieve the goal (using our own 
growth-based projections), with Asian countries accounting for a disproportionate share 
of success. India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Vietnam are all predicted to meet 
the target. Together these five countries will account for close to half (46 per cent) of 
the population of the developing world in 2015. Hence expressed in terms of the 
world’s population the prospects appear better (about half will reach the goal, which of 
course means that half will not), than when expressed in terms of countries (over two-
thirds will not meet the target). 6 
Figure 2: Income poverty 2015 (growth-based projections, differential elasticities) 
 
 
 
 
 
Percent of population
< 4.3 
> 4.3 to 10.3
> 10.3 to 24.4 
> 24.4 
Not available
 7 
Rural versus urban poverty 
The poverty rate is generally higher in rural areas than urban. Data were available on 
rural and urban poverty rates using the national poverty line for 56 countries for 
various years in the 1990s. The mean ratio of numbers of rural and urban poor was 
1.86 (and the median 1.53). For only seven of the 56 countries was urban poverty 
higher than rural, compared to 18 in which it was over twice as high in rural areas. In 
order to generate urban and rural poverty estimates for a larger number of countries 
this ratio was imputed based on a regression of determinants.7 The estimates are made 
at the country level, using (1) mostly regional growth rates with some country-
specific adjustments, and (2) elasticities which vary according to the degree of initial 
inequality. The main finding is that in 2015 two-thirds of the world’s income poor 
will be in rural areas. The majority of the populations in Africa and Asia will be rural 
until after 2020. Given the higher poverty rate in rural areas (16 per cent globally 
compared to 7 per cent in urban areas), it follows that these areas must account for a 
disproportionate number of the poor (Table 3). 
Table 3: Rural and urban poverty in 2015: headcount ratio and millions of people ($1 
a day) 
  Headcount ratio  Millions of people 
 
 
Total 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
 
Total 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
Per 
cent 
rural 
Sub-Saharan Africa  30.0 21.6  37.4  282  86  196  69.6 
Middle East and North Africa 2.8  1.6  4.2  10  4  6  63.6 
E. Europe and Central Asia  3.2  2.5  4.3  15  8  7  47.9 
East Asia and Pacific  5.7  3.1  8.4  120  33  87  72.5 
South Asia  14.8  10.6  16.8  255  59  196  76.8 
L. America and Caribbean  8.7  7.0  16.1  54  35  19  35.3 
             
Total 11.8  7.4  16.3  737  225  512  69.5 
Source: Authors’ estimates (see Appendix). 
Summary 
Recent estimates show that Africa is overtaking South Asia as the region with the 
largest number of those living on less than a dollar a day, and by 2015 half of those 
below this poverty line globally will be in that region. The prospects for most of 
Africa meeting the MDG of halving income poverty seem remote. These trends 
reflect both the region’s poorer growth performance and the fact that it has high and 
growing levels of inequality. By contrast the share of East Asia in world poverty is 
falling rapidly and will be only 3 per cent by 2015; this region will meet the MDG as 
will other parts of Asia. Latin American countries will be close to achieving the goal, 
but excluding several in South America. If a higher poverty line of $2 a day is used 
then the global poverty profile shifts, with South Asia again having most the world’s 
                                                 
7   The model contains net enrolments, the degree of urbanization and sub-regional dummies. 8 
poor, followed by Africa. Income poverty is higher in rural areas than urban ones. In 
2015, 70 per cent of the income poor will live in rural areas. 
4 Mortality 
Different estimates 
Hanmer and Naschold (2000) provide regression-based estimates of infant and under-
five mortality allowing for income, HIV/AIDS, education and health services.8 
However, there have been substantial upward revisions to mortality estimates in the 
base year (1990) since they carried out their analysis, so it is to be expected that their 
results have a downward bias. Indeed, the figures are lower than those available from 
other sources. Using data from the World Bank Global Monitoring Report, we made 
our own naïve projections at the regional level, and then adjusted these to allow for 
expected higher future growth. We also made country-specific estimates using a 
model based on poverty levels and female primary enrolment. The final estimates are 
those from the UN World Population Prospects, 2004 revision. These estimates are 
based on demographic trends, without reference to economic conditions, but 
nonetheless appear broadly consistent with the growth-adjusted estimates we made.  
 
Table 4: Mortality estimates 2015 (rates per 1,000) 
 Own  projections 
  
Hanmer 
and 
Naschold 
Naïve 
projection
Growth 
adjusted 
Model 
based 
UN 
population 
projections
Under-five mortality           
  Sub-Saharan Africa  118  168  138  97  130 
  Middle East and North Africa  34  42  30  31  28 
  East Asia and Pacific  8  30  32  27  30 
  South Asia   55  78  75  50  69 
  Latin America and Caribbean  15  25  10  24  22 
  Eastern Europe and Central Asia  6  29  30  25  30 
Infant mortality       
  Sub-Saharan Africa  67  96  89  89  80 
  Middle East and North Africa  22  53  28  28  25 
  East Asia and Pacific  7  24  27  27  25 
  South Asia   43  54  56  56  51 
  Latin America and Caribbean  14  19  29  29  17 
  Eastern Europe and Central Asia  10  25  31  31  6 
Note: Own projections are at regional level for model-based. 
Source: See text. 
                                                 
8   Infant mortality is the probability of death in the first year of life and under-five mortality that 
before the fifth birthday. These rates are expressed per 1,000 live births. Child mortality is the 
probability of death between first and fifth birthdays. 9 
However, the model based estimates show a stronger reduction in mortality, notably 
in SSA and South Asia, this discrepancy being driven by rapid growth of female 
enrolments in some countries and the fact that the model does not allow for additional 
AIDS related deaths (Table 4).  
Sub-regional and country data 
Table 5 shows the sub-regional figures using the UN Population projection estimates. 
Rates are highest in West and Central Africa. These are both areas in which tropical 
diseases remain important and so have unusually high ratios of child to infant deaths. 
But they are also areas in which conflict has adversely affected mortality. The maps 
show the scar of premature death running across Africa (Figure 3). 
Some trends 
All three major developing country regions have seen declining under-five mortality, 
though it has been more rapid in Asia and LAC than Africa (Figure 4). Indeed, the 
rate of reduction in Africa has been insufficient to keep up with population growth, so 
the number of deaths is continuing to climb. As a result, Africa’s share of under-five 
deaths is growing. In the case of infant deaths this trend represents a dramatic 
reversal. In the 1960s three-quarters of all infant deaths were in Asia, but by 2015 
Africa will account for the majority, as it has done for child deaths for some years 
now.  
 10 
Table 5: Sub-regional estimates of infant and under-five mortality, 2015  
  Infant mortality in 2015  U5M in 2015  Progress toward reducing U5M by two-thirds 
 
IMR (per 
000) 
Number 
(millions) 
Share U5M  (per 
000) 
Number 
(millions) 
Share  U5M in 2015 as a per 
cent of rate in 1990 
Number of countries 
expected to meet goal 
East Africa  71  0.9  15.8 113  1.3 16.9  65  0/16 
Central Africa  95  0.6  10.2  162  0.8  10.4  82  0/9 
North Africa  28  0.1  2.3 37 0.2  2.6  39  0/6 
Southern Africa  29  0.0  0.5 47 0.1  1.3  73  0/5 
West Africa  93  1.1  18.8 149  1.5 19.5  69  0/17 
Eastern Asia  23  0.5  7.7 27 0.5  6.5  58  0/5 
South-central Asia  50  1.9 32.7 67  2.5  32.5  55  0/14 
South-eastern Asia   26  0.3 4.6 32 0.3  3.9  41  3/11 
Western Asia  27  0.2  2.6 32 0.2  2.6  47  0/18 
Eastern Europe  12  0.0  0.5 15 0.0  0.0  71  2/10 
Northern Europe  4  0.0  0.1 6 0.0  0.0  ..  .. 
Southern Europe  6  0.0  0.1 7 0.0  0.0  ..  .. 
Western Europe  4  0.0  0.1 5 0.0  0.0  ..  .. 
Caribbean 27  0.0  0.6  39  0.0  0.0  52  0/12 
Central America   14  0.0  0.7  18  0.1  1.3  36  0/8 
South America  18  0.1  2.0 22 0.2  2.6  42  0/12 
Northern America  6  0.0  0.5 5 0.0  0.0  50  .. 
Australia/New Zealand  4  0.0 0.0  5  0.0  0.0  51  .. 
Melanesia 46  0.0  0.2  n.a.  0.0  0.0  68  .. 
Micronesia  35 0.0  0.0 8 0.0  0.0  26  .. 
Polynesia 17  0.0  0.0  14  0.0  0.0  33  .. 
Total 44  6.0  100.0  60  7.8  100.0    5/143 
Source: UN Population Projections 2004. 11 
Figure 3: Under-five mortality 2015 (UN Population Projection, 2004 Revision) 
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Not available 12 
However, as with income poverty reduction, the rate of decline is rarely sufficient to 
meet the ambitious goal of a two-thirds reduction by 2015. Our own projections 
suggest that only five countries will do so: Indonesia and Vietnam are the only two of 
significance (the others are Montserrat and Vanuatu; outside the sample, Portugal, 
Moldova and the Czech Republic will also do so). The UN Population projections are 
more optimistic, showing 10 countries expected to reach the target, with Egypt, Syria 
and Tunisia being amongst those added to the list. 
Figure 4: Mortality trends 
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Rural and urban differences 
Mortality is higher in rural areas than urban in virtually all countries of the world. 
Data from the last 15 years from 126 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) were 
examined. In only eight countries was infant mortality lower in rural areas than urban 
ones: on average IMR was just over one-third higher in rural areas, though the ratio 13 
was over two in the case of Peru. The contrast is stronger for child mortality, with the 
average ratio being 1.7 (median 1.6), in only five cases was rural mortality lower than 
that in urban areas, and rural mortality was double that in urban areas in 30 cases, 
reaching a ratio of 4.9 in Armenia. There are no clear regional patterns in these 
differentials. For simulation purposes, actual values of the ratio for under-five 
mortality are used for those countries covered by the survey, with remaining countries 
set at the sample median (1.4).9 The results are shown in Table 6 (applied to the 
model-based estimates). Of the 30 million under-five deaths in 2015, 20 million (i.e. 
two-thirds) will take place in rural areas. 
Table 6: Rural urban differentials in under-five mortality, 2015 
  U5M rate (per 000)  Number (millions) 
 Urban  Rural  Total  Urban  Rural  Total 
Sub-Saharan Africa  81  108  97  4.9  9.2  14.1 
Middle East and North Africa  24  39  31 0.6 0.6 1.2 
Europe and Central Asia  21  32  25  0.4  0.3  0.7 
East Asia and Pacific  19  35  27  1.4  2.5  3.9 
South  Asia  36  57  50 2.0 6.7 8.7 
Latin America and Caribbean  22  36  24  0.9  0.4  1.3 
          
Total  37  63  51  10.3 19.8 30.0 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
Water supply 
Lack of access to water will be a largely rural phenomenon by 2015: three quarters of 
the 761 million without access to water will be in rural areas. Lack of access will be 
concentrated in East Asia and SSA which will together account for 80 per cent of 
those without access (Table 7). 
 
                                                 
9   Given the importance of China, which is not covered by the DHS data, other sources were 
consulted. The 1997 China Human Development Report gives under-five mortality in rural area as 
71 compared to 21 in urban areas, a ratio of 3.5. This ratio is much larger than the sample 
maximum (2.2 for Peru) which might just reflect data differences, but may also be a real disparity 
on account of the strong differences in development in the western provinces compared to the 
eastern seaboard and the stronger enforcement of the one child policy in urban areas (personal 
communication: Hilary Standing and Gerry Bloom, IDS). The ratio for China is set to 2 for the 
simulation. 14 
Table 7: Access to water in 2015 
 
Access to water 
(% of population) 
Number without access 
(millions) 
  Urban Rural  Total Urban Rural  Total 
 
 
Share 
of total 
number
globally 
Share of 
those 
without 
access 
in rural 
areas 
Sub-Saharan Africa  82.2 57.6 69.3  72  227  288  38  79 
Middle East and N. Africa  96.0 79.4 89.7  9  30  37  5  80 
Europe and Central Asia  99.4  83.2  94.1  2  28  29  4  98 
East Asia and Pacific  86.3  78.2  85.4  147  225  308  41  73 
South  Asia  95.7 94.9 95.6  24  59  77  10  77 
L. America and Caribbean 98.0 85.4 96.5  10  18  22  3  81 
            
Total  91.4 81.5 87.8 264  586  761  100  77 
Source: Authors’ calculations, naïve projections. 
 
 
Summary 
All three major developing country regions have seen declining mortality, though it 
has been more rapid in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) than in 
Africa. But only in rare cases has the rate of reduction been at the 1.6 per cent a year 
required to achieve the MDG of a two-thirds reduction by 2015. Indeed, the rate of 
reduction in Africa has been insufficient to keep up with population growth, so the 
number of deaths is continuing to climb. As a result, Africa’s share of under-five 
deaths will continue to grow. In the case of infant deaths this trend represents a 
dramatic reversal. In the 1960s three-quarters of all infant deaths were in Asia, but by 
2015 Africa will account for the majority, as it has done for child deaths for some 
years now, with the highest rates in Western and Central Africa. Two-thirds of these 
deaths will be in the rural areas of Africa, which is a similar share of under-five deaths 
in rural areas across the world.  
 
Similar patterns reveal themselves with respect to critical determinants of under-five 
mortality: access to water and immunization. For example, West and Central Africa 
are also the two sub-regions with the lowest access to water expected in 2015. Over 
three-quarters of those without water in 2015 will be in rural areas. Immunization 
coverage fell in some countries in the 1990s and there remain a significant minority of 
countries with unacceptably low coverage rates. 
 
Falling under-five mortality, other health improvements which increase longevity and 
the demographic transition are increasing the share of the elderly in the population of 
all regions. This trend will in time create new problems for developing countries.  15 
5 Education 
 
The Millennium Project Task Force on Education (MPTFE) is the only study to 
estimate primary net enrolment rates.10 Projections are made based on predictive 
power of the s-curve (i.e. that later enrolments are harder) and suggest that SSA will 
continue to lag behind other regions with an estimated enrolment rate just under 80 
per cent. South Asia and Middle East and North Africa are also estimated to lie below 
90 per cent whilst other regions are expected to lie within five per cent of universal 
enrolment. This ‘last five per cent’ is increasingly recognized as being ‘problem 
groups’ requiring different policies. Our own country-level naïve projections do not 
allow for this effect, which may explain the higher figures in South Asia and LAC. 
Naïve projections seem appropriate since the policy push behind primary enrolments 
has enabled increases over and above those expected by economic performance or 
other possible determinants. It is the possibility of such a push in Africa which explain 
the higher rates there estimated by MPTFE. However, India began a very recent push, 
not yet shown in the data and so not picked up by naïve projections (Table 8). 
Table 8: Net primary enrolment rate, 2015 (proportion of age cohort enrolled) 
 MPTFE  Own  projections 
Sub-Saharan Africa  79.6  73.9 
South Asia  86.1  92.4 
Middle East and North Africa  88.0  89.3 
Latin America and Caribbean  95.6  98.0 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  96.3  91.3 
East Asia and Pacific  97.0  90.8 
Sources: MPTFE and own projections. 
 
The sub regional breakdown shows the problem in Africa to be least in southern 
Africa (Table 9), which is confirmed partially by the map, but it is patchy owing to 
limited data (Figure 5). Defining universal primary enrolment as an NER of 98 per 
cent shows that the majority of countries appear on track to achieve this goal.   
 
                                                 
10  UN Millennium Project (2005a).  16 
Table 9: Sub-regional primary enrolment rates (NER) and numbers out of school, 
2015 (millions) 
 
 
 
 
No. 
 
 
 
NER 
No. of 
countries 
with UPE 
by 2015 
  
 
 
No. 
 
 
 
NER 
No. of 
countries 
with UPE 
by 2015 
East Africa  13.9  76.5  9/17 S.  Europe  0.3 96.3  5/10 
Central Africa  5.6  77.3  7/9  W. Europe  0.2  98.0  .. 
North Africa  4.2  84.8  6/7 Caribbean  0.1  98.0 11/13 
Southern Africa  0.6  90.5  1/5 C.  America  0.4  98.0 24/24 
West Africa  15.4  70.8  12/18  South America  0.9  98.0  8/8 
Eastern Asia  9.3  91.8  4/7 N.  America  0.6  98.0  .. 
South-central Asia  19.1  91.2  10/14 Australia/NZ  0.0 98.0  .. 
South-eastern Asia   6.3  90.2 7/11  Melanesia  0.2  85.8  .. 
Western Asia  2.0  93.6  13/18 Micronesia  0.0 98.0  .. 
Eastern Europe  0.8  95.2  5/10 Polynesia  0.0 98.0  .. 
Northern Europe  0.2  97.6  11/13 Total  80.0 89.1 182/230 
Source: authors’ projections. 
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Figure 5: Net enrolment rates 2015 (naïve projections) 
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Numbers out of school 
Breaking down our own projections we see that SSA will account for nearly half of all 
the 80 million children out of primary school by 2015 (Table 10), reflecting the lower 
enrolment rates across the sub continent (Figure 5). 
Table 10: Numbers of children out of school 2015 (millions) 
  
Boys 
 
Girls 
 
Total 
Proportion 
girls 
Share of total 
out of school 
Sub-Saharan Africa  17.9 21.4 39.3  54.5  48.8 
Middle East and North Africa  2.4 2.4 4.7 49.8  5.9 
E. Europe and Central Asia  1.3  1.8  3.1  59.0  3.9 
East Asia and Pacific  9.5  5.9  15.4  38.4  19.1 
South Asia  6.8  8.5  15.3  55.7  19.0 
Upper middle income  0.7  0.7  1.3  50.0  1.7 
High  income  0.7 0.7 1.4 50.0  1.7 
         
Total  39.2 41.4 80.6  51.4  100.0 
Source: Authors’ projections. 
 
Gender dimension 
Areas with low enrolments have a disproportionate number of girls out of school (see 
table above). The MPTFE study also provides estimates of gender equality in primary 
education measured by female to male net primary enrolment. Sub-Saharan Africa is 
estimated to have the lowest ratio with 93 girls to 100 boys (Table 11).  
Table 11: Gender equality in education, female/male ratio 2015 
Region  MPTF on education 
(primary) 
MPTF on gender 
(primary, gross) 
Own estimates 
(primary) 
South Asia  95.3  111.0  99.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  93.2  94.6  98.8 
Latin America and  99.1  96.2  100.0 
Europe and Central Asia  99.3  98.3  99.2 
East Asia and Pacific  98.8  98.4  101.1 
Middle East and North Africa  96.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources: UN Millennium Project (2005b), and own estimates. 
 
Literacy 
No other estimates of literacy were located. Country-level projections were made for 
this report using two methods: (1) naïve projections, and (2) an accounting approach   19
based on the net enrolment rate.11 The two approaches are not entirely consistent, with 
naïve projections predicting lower literacy. This is because recent rapid increases in 
enrolments are not yet reflected in higher literacy, but the accounting approach picks up 
these increases. However, both methods find that the vast majority of illiterates in 2015 
will be in South Asia, with the majority of the remainder in SSA (Table 12). 
Table 12: Literacy in 2015 by region 
  Naïve projections  Accounting based 
 
Literacy 
rate 
No. of 
illiterates 
(millions) 
Literacy 
rate 
No. of 
illiterates 
(millions) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  81.7  99  93.7  34 
Middle East and North Africa  86.6  33  91.9  20 
Europe and Central Asia  99.1  4  99.3  3 
East Asia and Pacific  99.1  16  99.3  11 
South Asia  68.1  387  80.9  232 
Latin America and Caribbean  98.1  9  99.4  3 
Developed 99.1  8  96.8  26 
        
Total 89.6  555  93.8  329 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
Summary 
Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to lag behind other regions with respect to primary 
school enrolments with an estimated enrolment rate just under 80 per cent, though the 
problem is less in Southern Africa than elsewhere. South Asia and Middle East and 
North Africa are also estimated to lie below 90 per cent whilst other regions are 
expected to lie within five per cent from universal enrolment. However, this ‘last five 
per cent’ is increasingly recognized as being ‘problem groups’ requiring different 
policies.   
6 Nutrition 
Different estimates 
Nutrition outcomes have been comprehensively modeled in three different sources: two 
IFPRI studies (Smith and Haddad 2000; von Braun et al. 2005) and FAO’s agricultural 
projections.12 In addition Onis et al. (2004) present sub-regional based naïve 
                                                 
11  Older people with lower literacy were removed from the population and younger people who have 
been to school added to it. It is being assumed that all those enrolled are literate on completion. This is 
certainly a rather heroic assumption, but it is one that already lays behind the literacy data themselves. 
Literacy is capped at 99.5 in all countries. 
12   The forecasts from the latter IFPRI study are not given here as their results are only available in 
graphical form.   20
projections. The FAO study refers to adults who are undernourished (defined with 
reference to a calorie requirement of 1,900 kcal per day), whereas the IFPRI studies and 
Onis et al. refer to children only (using anthropometric measurement). The IFPRI results 
shown forecast for 2020 rather than 2015 (Table 13). 
 
The different estimates do not, in this case, give a similar picture. Smith and Haddad’s 
estimates are in general higher than those of Onis, and there is a marked discrepancy in 
the case of East Asia—which Smith and Haddad have as accounting for 15 per cent of 
children underweight by 2020, compared to Onis’ 3 per cent in 2015. Whilst, both have 
South Asia’s share as exceeding that of Africa, Smith and Haddad predict higher 
prevalence in South Asia than Africa, but Onis the reverse. FAO’s forecasts for adults 
give the two regions an equal share. 
Table 13: Alternative estimates of underweight  
 Adults  Children 
 
FAO 
(2015) 
Smith and 
Haddad (2020) 
Onis et al. 
(2015) 
Prevalence      
   South Asia  12  37.4  26.2 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  23  28.8  29.2 
   East Asia  6  12.8  3.0 
   Near East and North Africa  7  5  7.4 
   Latin America and Caribbean  6  1.9  3.4 
Numbers      
   South Asia  195  66  61.8 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  205  48.7  42.7 
   East Asia  135  21.4  3.0 
   Near East and North Africa  37  3.2  3.4 
   Latin America and Caribbean  40  1.1  2.0 
   Developing countries  612  140.4  112.9 
Shares      
   South Asia  31.9  47.0  54.7 
   Sub-Saharan Africa  33.5  34.7  37.8 
   East Asia  22.1  15.2  2.7 
   Near East and North Africa  6.0  2.3  3.0 
   Latin America and Caribbean  6.5  0.8  1.8 
   Developing countries  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: See text. 
 
The different studies do give broadly similar results for prevalence in SSA, as does 
another IFPRI recent study which suggests prevalence of child malnutrition to be 30.4 
per cent in 2015 by their baseline ‘business as usual’ scenario (Rosegrant et al. 2005). 
However, the point of that study is to show how different policy interventions—such as 
rural infrastructure and investing in agricultural research—can make an enormous 
difference to nutritional outcomes. The different scenarios place the number of 
malnourished children in 2025 at between 9.4 million and 55.1 million.   21
Some trends 
Figure 6 show trends from the FAO data. As mentioned above, the shares of Africa and 
Asia are about the same in 2015, reflecting a growing number of undernourished people 
in Africa, compared to a steady decline in South Asia. 
 
 
Figure 6: Patterns and trends from FAO data 
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These trends reflect differing trends in food availability. FAO report data on food 
consumption, based on calculations of food production and the net trade balance. Food 
consumption in Africa is set to rise slowly, falling further behind that of other regions 
(Table 14). This trend reflects the region’s dismal agricultural performance. In contrast 
to other regions which have experienced rising agricultural productivity since the 1960s, 
that in Africa has declined (Figure 7).   22
Table 14: Per capita food consumption (calories per person per day) 
 1964-66  1997-99  2015 
Developing  countries  2054 2681 2850 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  2058 2195 2360 
Near  East/North  Africa  2290 3006 3090 
Latin America and the Caribbean  2393  2824  2980 
South  Asia  2017 2403 2700 
East  Asia  1957 2921 3060 
Source: FAOSTAT (http://faostat.fao.org/). 
 
Figure 7: Trends in agricultural output per person (2000=100) 
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Source: calculated from FAOSTAT (http://faostat.fao.org/). 
 
Inequality 
The FAO report (FAO 2002) graphs differing levels of malnutrition for three different 
distributions against average food consumption. With high inequality, which is 
experienced in SSA, then the region’s average food availability yields undernutrition of 
23 per cent. But if the region were to have low inequality then, with the same level of 
food availability, undernutrition would be just 10 per cent. 
7 HIV/AIDS 
Projections related to diseases are plagued by additional uncertainty regarding both 
current prevalence rates, the appropriate models to be used for prediction purposes and 
the extent to which effective action will be taken to combat the disease. Based on 
current trends, UNFPA estimate that there will be 46 million new HIV infections by 
2010, but only one third that number (17 million) with an appropriate policy response 
(http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/inaction.htm). The three scenarios in a recent UNAIDS 
report on AIDS in Africa show that the current figure of 25 million adults living with 
HIV/AIDS may either fall to 14 million by 2025 or rise to 38 million—nearly 2/3 more 
than the optimistic estimate (Figure 8). Nonetheless, even the most pessimistic estimates   23
suggest that prevalence will decline, reflecting the belief that within 15 years there will 
be no new AIDS cases.   
Figure 8: HIV/AIDS three scenarios for Africa 
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Table 15: Number of HIV/AIDS related deaths 
 1990-95  2000-05  2010-15  2020-25  2045-50 
Absolute number of excess deaths from HIV/AIDS (000s)   
Sub-Saharan Africa  3216  14807  18933  18585  7510 
Asia 1314  3461  10872  17078  4821 
LAC 201  697  774  730  37 
More developed  427  789  1692  1557  49 
Total 5158  19754  32271  37950  12417 
          
Share of excess deaths (per cent) 
Sub-Saharan Africa  62.3 75.0 58.7 49.0 60.5 
Asia 25.5  17.5  33.7  45.0  38.8 
LAC 3.9  3.5  2.4  1.9  0.3 
More developed  8.3  4.0  5.2  4.1  0.4 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Note: more developed is Russia and USA.   
Source: UN Population Division. 
 
As AIDS in Africa is brought somewhat under control, attention is shifting to Asia, 
where the epidemic is in its early stages: the number of AIDS related deaths in Asia will 
quadruple in the next 15-20 years, compared to an increase of about one third in Africa. 
But, despite its larger population share, Asia will never account for even half of all 
deaths, a dubious honour that remains with Africa into the longer term (Table 15).13 
Africa’s share is likely under-stated in this table given the efficacy with which Asian 
                                                 
13   The table shows HIV/AIDS deaths from the UN Population Divisions medium variant. No global 
projections of the number of people living with HIV/AIDS have been found.   24
countries have been tackling the epidemic, and the continuing opportunity for some of 
these countries to head it off, compared to the more mixed picture in Africa. 
 
Whilst no systematic data are available, available data suggest that the incidence of 
HIV/AIDS is higher in urban areas,14 and many affected rural residents go to urban 
areas for treatment. However, since the majority of the population in Africa and Asia 
are rural it is possible that the absolute number of HIV/AIDS cases is higher in rural 
areas than urban ones.  
8 Conclusions   
There has been substantial progress in poverty reduction …  
 
The second half of the last century witnessed remarkable gains in the reduction of many 
forms of poverty. Mortality fell, and life expectancy rose, across the developing world 
at historically unprecedented rates—much faster than had been achieved in the now 
developed countries.  With the exception of countries affected by HIV/AIDS, under-five 
mortality has continued to decline in most countries even in times of economic 
stagnation or decline, thanks to increased immunization coverage, access to safe water 
and so on.  The last decade has seen many countries adopt programmes to ensure 
Universal Primary Education. 
 
… and this progress will continue, though not fast enough to achieve the MDGs … 
 
All projections suggest that these gains will continue into the new millennium, although 
not usually fast enough to achieve the ambitious targets set by the Millennium 
Development Goals. Neither the goal for income poverty reduction nor that for lower 
mortality will be met in the vast majority of countries. Attaining universal primary 
education is the one area where the goal looks achievable in many, though by no means 
all, countries. 
 
… so there will still be substantial poverty … 
 
Even if these goals were to be achieved substantial poverty will remain—the aim is only 
to half poverty not eliminate it. Current projects suggest there will be around three-
quarters of a billion people living on less than a dollar a day in 2015. In absolute terms 
the number of children dying prematurely in Africa will continue to rise for some years 
to come. 
 
… of which an increasing share will be in Africa. 
 
Progress has been, and will continue to be, slowest in Africa, opening up a growing gap 
between the region and the rest of the developing world. South Asia, formerly the 
poorest region, continues to have substantial numbers of undernourished children, and 
                                                 
14      The HIV/AIDS Surveillance Database of the US Census Bureau 
(http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/hivtable.html) reports data as ‘major city’ and ‘outside major city’, 
which is not the same as urban:rural. Nonetheless, these data show higher incidence in cities than 
outside in virtually all cases for which there are data.   25
the most children out of school (though recent efforts in India are not captured in the 
data). 
 
And whilst more will be in urban areas, it will still be predominately rural. 
 
Urban areas are growing rapidly, and with them slums. So poverty will become more 
and more an urban issue. But, other than HIV/AIDS, poverty indicators are worse in 
rural areas in virtually all countries. Since rural residents will remain the majority of the 
world’s population, the bulk of the poor (60-70 per cent depending on the indicator) will 
still be in rural areas in 2015. 
 
The nature of problems change … 
 
As poverty falls so does its character. Different polices are required when the bulk of 
the population are poor than when only a minority are so affected, especially as many of 
these remaining poor may share common characteristics (remote, ethnic minority, 
nomadic etc.). As under-five mortality falls it becomes more and more concentrated in 
the first months, or even days, of life. General socio-economic development and public 
health interventions can reduce high mortality rates, but once they are lower the 
required policies become more medically-intensive. ‘The last 5 per cent’ not in 
school—children of nomads, parents who think girls should not go to school, street 
children—are harder to reach, with simply providing schools not being enough. 
 
… new problems emerge … 
 
Development brings with it new problems. The demographic transition will increase the 
share of the elderly in the population. Obesity rises with urbanization. Smoking 
becomes a major health problem. 
 
… some remain hidden. 
 
But some age old problems—notably the plight of people with disabilities—remain with 
us and largely ignored. 
 
Finally, we should try to expect the unexpected. 
 
Predictions of progress assume ‘business as usual’. But shocks of various kinds should 
be expected, though their precise timing and location cannot be predicted with accuracy. 
Smaller shocks are frequent, but local in their effects and so with little impact on 
aggregate trends. Except for protracted conflict, smaller shocks also have short-lasting 
effects. But many low-income countries are vulnerable to very frequent small shocks, 
the cumulative impact of which seriously undermines poverty reduction efforts. More 
seriously still, there are strong grounds for believing there will be a major reversal, 
possibly related to either global conflict or environmental catastrophe, before the middle 
of this century.   26
Annex: projection methods 
The value of an outcome indicator, Yi,t, for country or region at time t is given in general 
by 
 
t i i i t i X Y , , 1 , 0 , β β + =          ( 1 )  
 
where  X is a vector of determinants comprising one or more variables. Hence the 
prediction of Y when t is at some point in the future (e.g. 2015) involves three 
unknowns: 
 
1.  Model specification: which variables to include in X 
 
2.  Projections of independent variables: the projected value of X at time t 
 
3.  Parameterization: The model parameters (estimation of which is usually based 
on historical data for X and Y). The general specification given in equation 1 
allows the parameter values to vary between country/region. 
 
Nearly all projections may be written in a form equivalent to equation (1).15 The main 
exceptions are those based on demographic models, such as those produced for the UN 
and some analyses of HIV/AIDS, which rely on demographic accounting identities.16  
However, even for these exceptions, the formulation in equation (1) identifies the three 
potential sources of differences in projections. Different model specifications (sets of X 
variables) are now discussed in turn. 
Constant time trend: naïve projections 
The simplest model is to assume that the future will be like the past, i.e. to pass future 
trends on historical ones. The most common way of doing this is to use a version of 
equation (1) in which the Y variable is logged and X is simply a time trend: 
 
T Y i i t i , 1 , 0 , ) ln( β β + =          ( 2 )  
 
so β1 = the annual rate of growth.17 Estimates of β1 may be made in two ways: 
 
1.  The most usual method is to estimate the rate of growth based on past data, 
usually from 1990 to the most recently available year. Hence it is being assumed 
that the indicator will continue to change at the same rate as it has done since 
1990. This approach is implicit in all discussions as to whether countries are ‘on-
                                                 
15 The most sophisticated models are multi-equations models, such as MAMS. However, even these 
approaches can be written as a single reduced form equation such as equation (1). 
16 There is also an exception when calculating income poverty, which is noted below. 
17 An alternative specification would be to leave Y unlogged, which would imply a constant absolute 
change in Y. This is not a very plausible specification, but is one of the four used by Ramadas et al. 
(2002) for the World Bank SimSIP project (see below). Otis et al. (2004) use a logistic formulation for 
their analysis of malnutrition, thus allowing for the fact that the dependent variable is bounded 
between zero and one.    27
track’ to meet the MDGs, and is the most commonly used with respect to social 
indicators (e.g. the Global Monitoring Report 2005 presentations for primary 
school completion and under-five mortality). 
 
2.  Demery and Walton (1998) assume a decline in under-five mortality of 1.5 per 
cent a year, which they say has been identified historically as an autonomous 
element in mortality reduction. These estimates are then augmented to allow for 
the effects of female education and income. 
 
The first of these approaches is labelled as ‘naïve projections’,18 since it takes no 
account of possible changes in the determinant variables between the previous period 
and the next.19 However, the method does have the virtue of simplicity: (1) there is no 
need to project the X variable (since the value of the time trend is of course known in 
the future), and (2) the underlying model is easy to grasp, policymakers can readily 
understand a statement such as ‘at the current rate of progress, the target of halving the 
proportion of the people who suffered from hunger in 1990 will not be met by 2015’ 
(UN MDG Report, Goal 1, 2005: 5). Naïve projections do give information of value. If 
a country is off track there have to be compelling reasons for believing that performance 
will change if it is thought the target might still be met. However, they are of dubious 
value in predicting expected values for future years, which is the main purpose of this 
report, for variables which are closely linked to underlying determinants. But for 
variables which can be autonomously driven by policy then naïve projections may prove 
superior predictors to the models discussed below. 
Income-based projections 
The next most common approach, and the dominant one for income poverty projections, 
is to model Y as depending solely on income (GDP per capita, preferably adjusted for 
PPP). The form of equation (1) takes logs of both dependent and independent variable: 
 
) ln( ) ln( , , 1 , 0 , t i i i t i INC Y β β + =         ( 3 )  
 
where INCi,t is GDP per capita for country/region i at time t. Given equation (3), β1 is 
the elasticity of Y with respect to income, that is the percentage change in Y given a 1 
percentage change in income per capita. 
 
The elasticity can be obtained from cross-country regressions. This procedure means 
that a single value of β1 is used for all countries. However β1 may be allowed to vary 
across sub-samples either by running sub-sample regressions, or allowing for a slope 
dummy for the required categories. For example, Hanmer and Naschold (2000) estimate 
different income elasticities for income poverty according to the level of inequality. 
 
Whilst in principle time series data could be used to produce country-specific estimates 
of  β1 there are in practice few countries with sufficient time series of the required 
                                                 
18  The terminology follows that used in economics; naïve expectations are the belief that the variable of 
interest will not change value from one period to the next. 
19    Since the dependent variable in equation (2) is logged, this means that the rate of change of 
determinants is being assumed constant in making naïve projections, not their level (which would be 
worse than naïve).   28
indicators.20 But in the case of income poverty then, as discussed in section 2 of this 
report, the elasticity is estimated by the slope of cumulative distribution function at the 
poverty line. Hence a single household income survey will allow a country-specific 
estimate of this elasticity.21 
 
This model specification assumes distribution neutral growth, that is the income of all 
income groups grows at the same rate (equal to the overall rate of growth). Such 
occurrences are a historical rarity; whilst it is difficult to detect any systematic statistical 
relationship between the rate of growth and inequality,22 this is not the same as saying 
that distribution does not change during growth episodes. It does, falling in roughly 
equal measure between growth episodes which are pro-poor (growth of income amongst 
the poor exceeds the average) and those which are anti-poor (growth of income amongst 
the poor is less than the average). Some analyses allow for changes in distribution 
during growth;23 e.g. Demery and Walton calculated the growth required to half poverty 
with distribution neutral growth and, for selected countries, assuming distribution 
worsens to a specified level (given by the current level in a comparator country). 
 
There remains debate as to the relative role of income versus other factors in 
determining social indicators. However, the forecaster is not so concerned with 
channels. The correlation between income per capita and most social indicators is high, 
with the R
2 from the simple regression typically being in the range 0.6-0.8. It is 
undoubtedly the case that the income term is picking up the effect of other determinants 
which are correlated with income, such as female education. But for forecasting 
purposes it is not necessary to separate out these effects. (Of course if female education 
has an effect independent from that of income, and education is not perfectly correlated 
with income, then the fit and therefore the forecast would be improved by adding this 
variable). Given this reasonably high R
2 from the simple regression, income-based 
forecasts can be taken as good first approximations. However, as will emerge in the 
subsequent discussions, ignoring distributional issues is a major shortcoming. 
Adding more explanatory variables 
Additional explanatory variables will improve the fit of the equation, and so the 
reliability of the forecast, provided that the predictions of the X variables are not too 
wildly inaccurate. Several studies have forecast various indicators using more 
explanatory variables. 
                                                 
20    Data sources such as World Development Indicators and the Human Development Report give a 
misleading impression of the availability annual estimates for most indicators. However, these series 
are based on less than annual data collection. The intervening years are obtained by interpolation. 
Estimates obtained in this way enable cross-country comparisons on an annual basis, but cannot be 
meaningfully used for time series analysis. 
21   A non-regression based approach can thus be used for income poverty estimates using household 
survey data. Assuming distribution neutral growth, the income of all households is increased by the 
same amount as the overall rate of GDP growth and the poverty measures recalculated. 
22  It is the absence of such a relationship which is in fact being demonstrated in the influential Dollar and 
Kraay paper ‘Growth is good for the poor’, rather than the widely drawn conclusion that growth 
generally (or even necessarily) benefits the poor. See White and Anderson (2001) for an elaboration of 
this point, and for operationalization of the definitions of pro-poor growth given here. 
23   This is different from the approach of Hanmer and Naschold mentioned above (and Hanmer et al. 
2000), in which the elasticity varies according to the initial level of inequality.   29
The main example is the World Bank project, Simulations for Social Indicators and 
Poverty (SimSIP, www.worldbank.org/simsip). This project, which grew out of 
projections made for the LAC region, provides spreadsheets which can be downloaded 
and used to make country-level projections of a range of MDG-type indicators. The 
projections may be based on either historical trends (using the best fitting of four 
possible ways of fitting a trend) or model-based elasticities, where the independent 
variables are economic growth, population growth, urbanization and a time trend. 
Income poverty measures are disaggregated by rural and urban. 
 
In addition to income, Hanmer and Naschold (2000) used HIV prevalence in the under-
five and maternal mortality equations, and the number of physicians in the former and 
literacy in the latter. Demery and Walton used female literacy in their under-five 
mortality equation. 
Multi-equation models 
Any solvable multi-equation model can, in principle, be written as a reduced form 
equation in the form of equation (1), i.e. expressing the outcome as a function of the 
exogenous variables in the model. In practice however, such models are run as 
computer simulations, showing the effect of different assumptions regarding the 
trajectories of the exogenous variables (and possibly under different parameter 
assumptions reflecting different policy scenarios). 
 
The World Bank has developed a model called MAMS, which is a CGE model 
incorporating social indicators. At present MAMS has only been applied to the case of 
Ethiopia. Whilst the CGE approach allows far more detailed modelling, critics of CGE-
based analyses are wary of the extent to which the results are driven by model 
assumptions, which may in the end be derived by fairly crude methods. Having said 
that, multi-equation approaches can pick up the complementarities between the different 
indicators, which single equation estimates will not.24  
 
Other multi-equation models have been used with respect to nutrition. FAO use 
country-level modelling of agricultural production and trade, from which they calculate 
nutrition outcomes. Two IFPRI studies have calculated child nutrition outcomes from 
different models (Smith and Haddad 2002; von Braun et al. 2005). 
The level of analysis 
Analysis is preferably carried out at country-level, and the result aggregated to present 
regional and global forecasts. No study can do this in its entirety, since there are 
countries for which data do not exist. Thus, either implicitly or explicitly, values are 
assigned to countries for which there are no data, most usually assuming their 
performance will equal the average for countries in that region (unlikely to be a good 
assumption since countries without data are more likely poor performers). 
 
The level of analysis matters not only as each country may require different parameters 
and exogenous values, but because aggregation may conceal country-level limits. This 
                                                 
24  This has elsewhere been called this the ‘basic needs multiplier’ (White 1997) and in more recent work 
on Ghana identified the importance of the ‘inter-generational multiplier’ whereby parents who have 
themselves been educated are more likely to send their own children to school (World Bank 2004).   30
is the case for many of the MDGs for which it is true that the world as a whole is on 
track to meet the goal simply by virtue of China’s performance. It would therefore be 
wrong to say that if current trends continue then the goal will be met—not only because 
it will be met in China but not many other places (though this is true), but because 
China cannot logically sustain its rate of progress (more than 100 per cent of children 
cannot go to school, and less than 0 per cent cannot live below the poverty line).  
Summary 
Projections may vary because of differences in assumptions regarding (1) determinants, 
(2) model parameters, or (3) future values of the determinants. The simplest models—
and by far the most common approach—take time as the only determinant. The result 
tells us if a country is on track or not to meet the relevant goal, which is certainly of 
policy interest, but of less use in predicting the actual expected value at some point in 
the future. Since income is highly correlated with most of the outcomes of interest, a 
first approximation can be given by applying the relevant elasticity to projected growth 
rates. This is the basis for many projections. 
 
However the correlation with income is imperfect, so adding more variables to the right-
hand side will help, at least if their future values can be predicted with any degree of 
confidence. It is argued below that distribution is a right-hand side variable which 
should not be ignored. More sophisticated versions utilize multi-equation models. There 
are undoubted advantages to such models, which allow a wider range of policy 
simulations, but they are quite resource intensive and assumption dependent. 
 
Table A1: Summary of main approaches to projecting MDG indicators 
Model specification  Parameterization  Projection of independent variables 
Naïve projections  Calculation of historical 
growth rate 
Not necessary (only independent 
variable is time trend, which is 
known). 
Income-based    (1) Elasticities taken from 
existing studies; 
(2) regression-based 
estimates 
(1) Use of regional growth forecasts 
by recognized authority (usually WB 
Global Economic Prospects); 
(2) regression-based growth 
estimate based on initial values. 
Income plus models  As for income-based  As for income-based 
Multi-equation models  (1) Regression-based; 
(2) CGE approach 
Assumed values for different policy 
simulations 
Source: See text.   31
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